Political and Economic Section

Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006 -- Cameroon

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 06, 2007

Preface

Across the globe, men and women are pushing for greater personal and political freedom and for the adoption of democratic institutions. They are striving to secure what President Bush calls "the non-negotiable demands of human dignity."

Despite personal risk and against great odds, courageous individuals and nongovernmental groups expose human rights abuses. They seek to protect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, workers, and women, and to stop the trafficking in human beings. They work to build vibrant civil societies, ensure free and fair elections, and establish accountable, law-based democracies.

These impatient patriots are redefining the limitations of what was previously thought to be possible. Indeed, in the span of a few generations freedom has spread across the developing world, communist dictatorships have collapsed, and new democracies have risen. The rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are protected more fully and by more countries than ever before.

This noble work continues - but it is not yet complete and it faces determined opponents. Not surprisingly, those who feel threatened by democratic change resist those who advocate and act for reform. Over the past year, we have seen attempts to harass and intimidate human rights defenders and civil society organizations and to restrict or shut down their activities. Unjust laws have been wielded as political weapons against those with independent views. There also have been attempts to silence dissenting voices by extralegal means.

Whenever non-governmental organizations and other human rights defenders are under siege, freedom and democracy are undermined. The world's democracies must defend the defenders. That is one of the primary missions of our diplomacy today, and we hope that the Department of State's County Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 will help to further this effort. With these thoughts, I hereby submit these reports to the United States Congress.

Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State

Introduction

These reports describe the performance of governments in putting into practice their international commitments on human rights. These fundamental rights, reflected in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, constitute what President Bush calls the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity." As Secretary Rice has said, the full promise of the UN Universal Declaration cannot be realized overnight, but it is urgent work that cannot be delayed.

The Universal Declaration calls upon "every individual and every organ of society … to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance..."

The United States takes its human rights commitments seriously. We recognize that we are writing this report at a time when our own record, and actions we have taken to respond to the terrorist attacks against us, have been questioned. The United States will continue to respond forthrightly to the good faith concerns of others, including by means of the reports we submit periodically in accordance with our obligations under various human rights treaties to which we are a party. We are also committed to continual improvement. US laws, policies, and practices governing the detention, treatment, and trial of terrorist suspects have evolved considerably over the last five years. Our democratic system of government is not infallible, but it is accountable--our robust civil society, our vibrant free media, our independent branches of government, and a well established rule of law work as correctives.

The congressionally mandated country reports on human rights practices that follow are an essential element of the United States' effort to promote respect for human rights worldwide. For three decades, these annual reports have been used widely here and abroad as a reference document for assessing the progress made and the challenges that remain. They also have served as a foundation for cooperative action among governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all.

The reports review each country's performance in 2006. Each report speaks for itself. Yet, broad patterns are discernible and are described below, supported by country-specific examples. The examples we cite are illustrative, not exhaustive.

Hopeful Trends, Yet Sobering Realities

As a review of these reports shows, across the globe in 2006, men and women continued to press for their rights to be respected and their governments to be responsive, for their voices to be heard and their votes to count, for just laws and justice for all. There also was a growing recognition that democracy is the form of government that can best meet the demands of citizens for dignity, liberty, and equality. These are hopeful trends indeed, yet the reports also reflect sobering realities:

First, the advances made in human rights and democracy were hard won and challenging to sustain. While some countries made significant progress, some lagged and others regressed.

As the range of examples below demonstrates, the performance of countries varied greatly, depending on factors such as the degree of governmental commitment, institutional capacity, the extent of corruption, and the strength of civil society.

In January 2006 Liberia's democratically elected Unity Party government, led by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the first female head of state in Africa, replaced the National Transitional Government of Liberia, which had served as the interim government since the end of a ruinous 14-year civil war in 2003. The government took significant steps to correct past human rights deficiencies, including working with international partners to rehabilitate the country's justice sector and establishing a public defender's office in the capital. The president dismissed or suspended a number of corrupt government officials. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2005 to investigate human rights violations and war crimes committed during the civil war, began taking statements from witnesses. Despite this progress, Liberia continued to face serious human rights challenges, including a still weak judiciary, official corruption and impunity, gender-based violence, and extreme poverty that led to child labor.

Substantial reductions in killings by the armed forces and the police in politically sensitive areas of Indonesia continued during the year. Fifty-four generally free and fair elections were held at the provincial, regency, district, and municipal levels, most notably in December in Aceh, where a former rebel field commander won the governorship. Although inter-communal religious violence generally abated, it nonetheless persisted in some areas. The government and the courts were unable to confront past human rights abuses and atrocities both in Indonesia and in East Timor.

Morocco's human rights record showed notable progress, although problems remained. The government began to address past human rights abuses by providing compensation through the Consultative Council on Human Rights for specific cases of arrest, disappearance, and abuse during the period between 1956 and 1999. In March the government enacted an antitorture law, although reports of torture by various branches of the security forces persisted. There was extensive and largely open debate in public and in the press, despite continuing restrictions on freedom of the press and speech. During the year the government punished some journalists who violated limitations on free speech, and many journalists practiced self-censorship. Trafficking in persons, particularly for sexual exploitation, and child labor remained issues of concern; however, both the government and civil society were increasingly active in addressing them.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo held its first democratic presidential and legislative elections in more than 45 years, putting an end to a three-year post-civil war transitional period. A new constitution went into force. Yet, the human rights record remained poor. In addition to simmering conflict in the east, where government control remained weak and armed groups continued to commit serious abuses, government security forces across the country also committed serious abuses with impunity.

In Haiti, citizens demonstrated their commitment to democracy by going to the polls three times in 2006. More than 3.5 million citizens registered to vote, and an impressive turnout estimated at more than 70 percent of registered voters participated in the first round of presidential and parliamentary elections in February. After a relatively stable and violence-free election process, voters selected President Rene Preval and filled 129 parliamentary seats. In December, Haiti held its first municipal elections in more than a decade. Yet much remains to be done to restore fully the rule of law, including an overhaul of Haiti's dysfunctional judicial system and the continued retraining and vetting of the Haitian National Police.

In Ukraine, notable post-Orange Revolution progress in human rights performance continued to be made. The March 2006 parliamentary elections were the freest in 15 years of independence. The country continued to make improvements in press freedom, freedom of association, and the development of civil society. Despite these gains, a number of serious problems remained, including corruption in all branches of government.

Although Kyrgyzstan's human rights record had improved considerably following the change to democratically elected leadership in 2005, during 2006 a week of mass yet peaceful protests culminated in the hasty adoption of an amended constitution that offered the possibility for genuine checks and balances. At the end of December, however, parliament passed another constitution negating many key checks and balances. The government also harassed foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Despite President Musharraf's stated commitment to democratic transition and "enlightened moderation," Pakistan's human rights record continued to be poor. Restrictions remained on freedom of movement, expression, association, and religion. Disappearances of provincial activists and political opponents continued, especially in provinces experiencing internal turmoil and insurgencies. The security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Arbitrary arrest and torture remained common. Corruption was pervasive throughout the government and police forces. On a positive note, in December the National Assembly passed and President Musharraf signed the Women's Protection Bill - marking the first time in three decades that a Pakistan government successfully rolled back laws detrimental to women's rights. The law amends the 1979 rape and adultery provision of the Hudood Ordinance by transferring the offense of rape from Pakistan Sharia law to the Pakistan Penal Code. The law also eliminates the requirement for rape victims to present four male witnesses to press charges.

Though Egypt held a first-ever, multi-party presidential election in 2005, in 2006 public calls for greater democratization and accountability sometimes met with strong government reaction. The continued imprisonment of former presidential candidate Ayman Nour raised serious concerns about the path of political reform and democracy in the country. Continuing a trend begun in 2005, the government arrested and detained hundreds of activists affiliated with the banned-but-tolerated Muslim Brotherhood, generally for periods lasting several weeks. Two senior judges were brought in for questioning in February for publicly calling for an independent judiciary. Egyptian police arrested and detained over 500 activists for participating in demonstrations in support of judicial independence. In addition, severe cases of torture by authorities were documented. The government also arrested, detained, and abused several Internet bloggers.

In Kazakhstan, the government restricted the functioning of the political opposition by enforcing onerous registration requirements and hindering or denying political party registration. The merging of progovernment parties consolidated the firm leadership of President Nazarbayev's Otan Party and left less political space to express alternative views and advocate for reform. The government harassed the political opposition via politically motivated charges and restrictions on freedom of assembly, passed laws restricting press freedom, and harassed NGOs.

Russia experienced continuing centralization of power in the executive branch, including amendments to election laws and new legislation for political parties that grants the government broad powers to regulate, investigate, limit, and even close down parties. Taken together with a compliant State Duma, corruption and selectivity in law enforcement, political pressure on the judiciary, and restrictions on the NGOs and the media, these trends resulted in the further erosion of government accountability. In Chechnya and other areas of the North Caucasus, serious human rights violations continued, including unlawful killings and abuses of civilians by both federal and Chechen Republic security forces. Rebel fighters committed terrorist bombings and politically motivated disappearances in the region. In a growing number of cases, the European Court of Human Rights held Russia responsible for these abuses.

In Venezuela, the Chavez government continued to consolidate power in the executive branch. The government continued to harass the opposition and NGOs and to weaken judicial independence. International observers judged generally free and fair the December presidential elections, in which President Chavez won re-election with 63 percent of the vote. In his inaugural address, President Chavez asked the National Assembly, in which his parties control 100 percent of the seats, to grant him power to rule by executive decree.

In Fiji and Thailand, militaries overthrew democratically elected governments.

A second sobering reality is that insecurity due to internal and/or cross-border conflict can threaten or thwart advancements in human rights and democratic government.

Despite the Iraqi government's continuing commitment to foster national reconciliation and reconstruction, keep to an electoral course, and establish the rule of law, both deepening sectarian violence and acts of terrorism seriously undercut human rights and democratic progress during 2006. Although the Iraqi constitution and law provide a strong framework for the protection of human rights, armed groups attacked human rights from two different directions: those proclaiming their hostility to the government--Al-Qa'ida terrorists, irreconcilable remnants of the Ba'athist regime, and insurgents waging guerrilla warfare; and members of Shi'a militias and individual ministries' security forces--nominally allied with the government--who committed torture and other abuses.

Although Afghanistan made important human rights progress since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, its human rights record remained poor. This was mainly due to weak central institutions and a deadly insurgency: the Taliban, Al-Qa'ida, and other extremist groups stepped up attacks against government officials, security forces, NGOs and other aid personnel, and unarmed civilians; and the number of suicide bombings rose dramatically during the year, as did attacks on schools and teachers. There were continued reports of cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial killings, torture, and poor prison conditions. In December President Karzai launched a Transitional Justice Action Plan designed to address past violations of human rights and improve the institutional capacity of the justice system.

Lebanon's significant steps toward reform following the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops after nearly three decades of occupation have been hampered since the July-August 2006 conflict between Hizballah and Israel. Before the conflict, the Lebanese government had started to remove many of the obstacles that barred political associations and parties. After Hizballah entered Israel from Lebanese territory and kidnapped and killed several Israeli soldiers, Israeli military forces responded by entering Lebanese territory. The conflict ended with an UN-sponsored cessation of hostilities. Despite the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of the Lebanon Armed Forces and UN Interim Forces in the south, Lebanese militias and Hizballah retained significant influence over parts of the country.

In East Timor, a series of deadly clashes between the national defense force and a variety of dissident military, police, and civilian forces led to widespread mob and gang violence in the capital. At the request of the government, forces from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal assumed responsibility for security in the capital. On August 25, the UN Integrated Mission for East Timor took over policing responsibilities. This internal conflict resulted in the displacement of approximately 150,000 people, more than 15 percent of the country's population.

Third, despite gains for human rights and democratic principles in every region of the world, much of humanity still lives in fear yet dreams of freedom.

Countries in which power remained concentrated in the hands of unaccountable rulers--whether totalitarian or authoritarian--continued to be the world's most systematic human rights violators.

In 2006 North Korea remained one of the world's most isolated and repressive regimes. The regime controls almost all aspects of citizens' lives, denying freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, and restricts freedom of movement and worker rights. The constitution provides for "freedom of religious belief," but genuine religious freedom does not exist. An estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people, including political prisoners, were held in detention camps, and many prisoners died from torture, starvation, disease, and exposure.

The military government in Burma extensively used executions, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and forced relocation of entire villages, particularly of ethnic minorities, to maintain its grip on power. Prisoners and detainees were subjected to abuse and held in harsh, life-threatening conditions. Surveillance, harassment, and imprisonment of political activists continued; Nobel Laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi remained incommunicado under house arrest, and over 1,100 political prisoners languished in prison. The use of forced labor, trafficking in persons, conscription of child soldiers, and religious discrimination remained widespread. The government reconvened the sham National Convention, handpicking delegates and prohibiting free debate. Touted as part of a "democracy road map", the convention was designed to nullify the results of the 1990 election and adopt a new, regime-friendly constitution. The regime's cruel and destructive misrule also resulted in refugee outflows, the spread of infectious diseases, and the trafficking of drugs and human beings into neighboring countries.

The Iranian government flagrantly violated freedom of speech and assembly, intensifying its crackdown against dissidents, journalists, and reformers - a crackdown characterized by arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, disappearances, the use of excessive force, and the widespread denial of fair public trials. The government continued to detain and abuse Baha'is and other religious minorities and hosted a widely condemned conference denying the existence of the Holocaust. In the lead-up to the December 15 Assembly of Experts elections in Iran, more than two-thirds of those who had applied to run - including all female candidates - were disqualified, leaving many seats uncontested. Hundreds of candidates in nationwide municipal elections also were disqualified. The government continued to flout domestic and international calls for responsible government in 2006 by supporting terrorist movements in Syria and Lebanon as well as calling for the destruction of a UN member state.

In Zimbabwe, the Mugabe government continued across-the-board violations of human rights. Official corruption and impunity were widespread. The 2002 Official Secrets Act and Public Order and Security Act remained in effect, severely restricting civil liberties. In the 2006 parliamentary by-elections and rural district council elections, the government's manipulation of the electoral process disenfranchised voters and skewed elections in favor of ruling party candidates. The ruling party's dominance permitted constitutional changes without wide consultation. Security forces harassed, beat, and arbitrarily arrested critics and opposition supporters. Disruptions at farms and seizures of property continued and were sometimes violent. The campaign of forced evictions, which left 700,000 people homeless during Operation Restore Order in 2005, continued on a lesser scale. The government interfered with humanitarian organizations' efforts to provide assistance. In December Mugabe and his loyalists proposed extending his term for two years by deferring presidential elections to 2010.

In Cuba, the government, temporarily headed by Raul Castro due to Fidel Castro's illness, continued to violate virtually all the rights of its citizens, including the fundamental right to change their government peacefully or criticize the revolution or its leaders. In 2006 the government increased its harassment of dissidents and other citizens viewed as threats to the government, often through mob actions called "acts of repudiation" involving verbal abuse and physical attacks. Beatings and abuse of detainees and prisoners also were carried out with impunity. Although token releases of prisoners occurred during the year, at least 283 political prisoners and detainees were held at year's end, including 59 of 75 prodemocracy and human rights activists imprisoned in a March 2003 crackdown.

The Chinese government's human rights record deteriorated in some areas in 2006. There was an increased number of high-profile cases involving the monitoring, harassment, detention, and imprisonment of political and religious activists, journalists, and writers as well as defense lawyers seeking to exercise their rights under the law. Some of their family members also were harassed and detained. Large numbers of mass demonstrations and protests calling for redress of grievances continued and in some cases were violently suppressed. New government controls were imposed on: NGOs; the media, including the Internet; and courts and judges. Repression of unregistered religious groups and of minority groups, in particular Uighurs and Tibetans, remained a serious concern.

In Belarus, the Lukashenko government continued and intensified its repressive policies. The March presidential election was severely flawed. Up to 1,000 people were arrested in an ensuing crackdown on public protests against the results and many were sentenced to short jail terms. More activists and opposition members, including Aleksander Kozulin, who ran against Lukashenko in the presidential race, were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 2 to 5 ½ years.

The Eritrean government continued to be one of the most repressive in Sub-Saharan Africa, and its human rights record worsened in 2006. Government security forces committed extrajudicial killings; there were credible reports that security forces shot on sight individuals trying to cross the border into Ethiopia. The government escalated its campaign of arresting national service evaders as well as their relatives, and there also were credible reports indicating that some of those arrested were tortured. As it did in 2005, the government ordered several international humanitarian NGOs to leave the country, despite a severe drought in the Horn of Africa. There were continued severe restrictions on religious freedom.

The fourth sobering reality is that as the worldwide push for greater personal and political freedom grows stronger, it is being met with increasing resistance from those who feel threatened by political and societal change.

Human rights defenders and nongovernmental organizations are essential to a nation's success. In today's world, the problems confronting states are too complex even for the most powerful to tackle alone. The contributions of civil society and the free flow of ideas and information are crucial in addressing a host of domestic and international challenges. Restricting the political space of NGOs and public debate only limits a society's own growth.

In every region of the globe in 2006, there were governments that responded to the growing demands for personal and political freedom not by accepting their obligations to their people but by oppressing those who advocated for human rights and who exposed abuses, such as nongovernmental organizations and independent media, including the Internet. A disturbing number of countries passed or selectively applied laws and regulations against NGOs and journalists. NGOs and journalists also were subjected to extralegal measures, often by unknown assailants. For example:

In Russia in 2006, a new NGO law entered into force in April imposing more stringent registration requirements for NGOs, strict monitoring of organizations, extensive and onerous reporting requirements on programming and activities, and empowering the Federal Registration Service to deny registration or to shut down an organization based on vague and subjective criteria. Freedom of expression and media independence declined due to government pressure and restrictions. In October unknown persons murdered human rights defender Anna Politkovskaya, a prominent journalist known for her critical writing on human rights abuses in Chechnya. The government used its controlling ownership of all national television and radio stations, as well as of the majority of influential regional ones, to restrict access to information deemed sensitive.

In Belarus, onerous tax inspections and NGO registration requirements made it difficult for civil society organizations to operate, and attacks against members of the independent media continued. In November prodemocracy activist Dmitriy Dashkevich was sentenced to 18 months in prison for operating an unregistered NGO.

The government of Kazakhstan registered the opposition True Ak Zhol party after one of its co-chairmen, Sarsenbaiuly, was killed and restrictively interpreted Article 5 of the constitution to suspend foreign-funded, nonpartisan political party training activities, asserting that providing information is tantamount to financing political parties. In July President Nazarbayev signed into law restrictive media amendments deemed a step backward by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Freedom of Media Representative. The government continued to use restrictive libel laws to fine, convict, and suspend media outlets, journalists, and critics. In April a member of a suspended media outlet was brutally beaten.

Freedom of expression, association and assembly are tightly restricted in Turkmenistan, and the government sought to control all NGO activity. Foreign-origin satellite television is accessible throughout the country, but the government controlled all domestic media, and local journalists were prohibited from all contact with foreigners unless specifically permitted. Very limited Internet access was provided through government-owned Turkmen Telecom; no new accounts were allowed in the capital since September 2002. In August the government arrested journalists Ogulspapar Myradova, Annakurban Amanklichev, and Sapardurdy Hajiyev and sentenced them to six to seven years of imprisonment for weapons possession in a closed, summary trial. In September Myradova, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent, died in prison under suspicious circumstances. NGOs have reported that she and her two colleagues were tortured during detention in the summer to extract confessions of weapons possession. On December 21, President Saparmurat Niyazov died.

The Government of Uzbekistan sought to control most NGO activity and closed down over 200 civil society organizations, including international NGOs operating in the country, citing alleged violations of the law. Independent journalists and human rights activists continued to be persecuted.

The Syrian government strictly controlled the dissemination of information and prohibited criticism of the government and discussion of sectarian issues, including religious and minority rights. There were detentions and beatings for individual expressions of opinion that violated these restrictions, for example the February arrest of journalist Adel Mahfouz after he called for interfaith dialogue following the controversy surrounding the depiction of the Prophet Muhammed in cartoons. The government relied on its press and publication laws, the penal code, and the Emergency Law to censor access to the Internet, and it restricted electronic media. Harassment of domestic human rights activists also occurred, including regular close surveillance and the imposition of travel bans when they sought to attend workshops and conferences outside the country.

Press freedom was at an all-time low in Iran, as the government closed independent newspapers Shargh and Iran, blocked access to Internet news sites--including the New York Times and BBC Farsi--and jailed journalists and bloggers. The authorities used bans against leaving the country as a weapon against journalists.

In Burundi, there was an increase in the arrest, detention, and intimidation of journalists and human rights activists by the government; among many other individuals, police arrested and detained for several months the president of the country's leading anticorruption NGO. A governor of one province reportedly called the country's leading human rights NGO, League Iteka, an enemy of peace, and in November a government official announced that 32 registered international NGOs in the country could face expulsion for failure to submit mandatory annual reports to the government.

In Rwanda, there was a restrictive atmosphere for the functioning of civil society. Domestic and international NGOs are required by law to register each year and to provide reports to the government on their activities. Authorities reportedly required some NGOs to obtain government authorization for some projects before being allowed to access international donor funds. In addition, all NGOs were expected to join a collective intended to manage their activities.

The Venezuelan government continued to harass and intimidate civil society groups, most notably the leaders of the electoral watchdog NGO Sumate, whose trial for conspiracy and treason for accepting a foreign grant was indefinitely postponed but continues to hang over their heads. At year's end a draft law was under consideration in the National Assembly which, if implemented, would increase government control over NGOs' financing and restrict NGOs from working in the areas of human rights or democracy promotion. Amendments to the penal code that impose prison sentences for insulting public officials and violent attacks on journalists contributed to a climate of self-censorship. The government stepped up its harassment of independent and opposition news outlets. In December President Chavez announced that the government would not renew the broadcast license of Radio Caracas Television, the country's oldest commercial television network. The government accused the network owners of being "coup-mongers" and of violating the public trust.

In China, NGOs, both domestic and international, continued to face increased scrutiny and restrictions. By the end of 2006, Reporters without Borders reported that 31 journalists and 52 Internet writers were in jail. While the government encouraged use of the Internet, it also took steps to monitor its use, control content, restrict information, and punish those who violated regulations. The government imposed stricter website registration requirements, enhanced official control of online content, and expanded the definition of illegal online content. The government consistently blocked access to sites it deemed controversial, and the authorities reportedly began to employ more sophisticated technology enabling the selective blocking of specific content rather than entire websites.

Vietnam continued to monitor and restrict the Internet, blocking international human rights and news websites. Laws allow citizens to complain openly about inefficient government and corruption, but the government continued to prohibit the press from drafting articles that questioned the role of the Communist Party, promoted pluralism or multiparty democracy, or questioned human rights policy. The government forbids direct access to the Internet through Independent Service Providers and requires cybercafé owners to register the personal information of their customers and the sites visited. The government released several high-profile political and religious dissidents, including Dr. Pham Hong Son, who was imprisoned for translating articles on democracy and disseminating them over the Internet.

Genocide was the most sobering reality of all.

Almost 60 years after the adoption of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights--an expression of the outraged conscience of mankind to the enormity of the Holocaust and the cataclysm of the Second World War--genocide continued to ravage the Darfur region of Sudan.

Despite the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the 22-year civil war between the north and south, and the establishment of a unity government that year, ethnic conflict continued in Sudan, most catastrophically in Darfur. The Sudanese government andgovernment-backed janjaweed militia bear responsibility for the genocide in Darfur, and all parties to the conflagration committed serious abuses, including the widespread killing of civilians, rape as a tool of war, systematic torture, robbery, and recruitment of child soldiers. By the end of 2006, the Darfur conflict had resulted in at least 200,000 civilian deaths and two million displaced by the fighting. Over 234,000 refugees had fled to neighboring Chad, and both Chad and the Central African Republic experienced violent ethnic conflict along their borders with Sudan.

In spite of indicating its support for the Addis Ababa framework, the Sudanese government publicly rejected international forces for Darfur and renewed its military offensive during the latter half of 2006. The deteriorating security conditions forced some international NGOs and humanitarian organizations to scale back or suspend operations.

Defend the Defenders

If the great promise of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is to be fulfilled, the international community--and especially the world's democracies--cannot accept that today's sobering realities are impervious to change. Indeed, they compel us to align ourselves with those who work for human dignity and political reform.

In 2006 the courageous efforts of human rights defenders were highlighted by democratic governments:

Country resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 emphasized the need to protect human rights defenders in Iran, Belarus, North Korea, and Burma.

The UN Democracy Fund, growing out of an idea presented to the General Assembly by President Bush in 2004 and established in 2005, completed its first year successfully. Its board agreed to fund 125 projects out of more than 1,300 proposals submitted by over 100 countries--a disbursal of more than $35 million in grants mostly to prodemocracy civil society organizations.

At the regional level, in June 2006 the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Declaration of Santo Domingo, a groundbreaking multilateral commitment by the countries of the region to "guarantee the liberty of every person to enjoy freedom of expression, including access to uncensored political debate and the free exchange of ideas through all forms of mass media, including the Internet." The Foreign Ministers also declared their resolve to develop and encourage strategies and best practices to that effect.

The OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' Unit for Human Rights Defenders issued a report on the serious problems they face in some countries, emphasizing the need for governments to support their work.

In advance of the July African Union Assembly of the Heads of State, civil society organizations from 19 African countries met in Banjul, The Gambia, to develop recommendations for summit leaders regarding civil society's role in the African Peer Review Mechanism on countries' compliance with treaty obligations, ways to improve access to information by civil society, and citizenship laws that entrench discrimination. These recommendations were adopted at the summit.

In the Broader Middle East and North Africa region the Forum for the Future brought together government officials and civil society representatives from the region, along with G-8 partners, at the Dead Sea in Jordan. Nearly 50 civil society leaders representing hundreds of organizations from 16 countries of the region participated in discussions on the rule of law, transparency, women's and youth empowerment, and the legal environment for civil society organizations. They also discussed how to strengthen reform by establishing mechanisms to follow up on recommendations. Though the hardest part lies ahead--adoption and implementation of recommendations put forward by civil society--the Forum helped to open political space that did not before exist for civil society organizations to form and interact with governments in the region.

Marking International Human Rights Day in December 2006, Secretary Rice launched two important U.S. initiatives in support of human rights and democracy defenders:

She announced the creation of a Human Rights Defenders Fund to be administered by the State Department that will quickly disburse small grants to help human rights defenders facing extraordinary needs as a result of government repression. This funding could go to cover legal defense, medical costs, or the pressing needs of activists' families.

Secretary Rice also issued ten guiding NGO Principles regarding the treatment by governments of nongovernmental organizations. These core principles will guide U.S. treatment of NGOs, and we also will use them to assess the actions of other governments. The principles are meant to complement lengthier, more detailed United Nations and other international documents addressing human rights defenders and can help to rally worldwide support for embattled NGOs by serving as a handy resource for governments, international organizations, civil society groups, and journalists.

When democracies support the work of human rights advocates and civil society organizations, we are helping men and women in countries across the globe shape their own destinies in freedom. And by so doing, we are helping to build a safer, better world for all.

We must defend the defenders, for they are the agents of peaceful, democratic change.

Cameroon
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Cameroon, with a population of approximately 17.3 million, is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Despite the country's multiparty system of government, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) has remained in power since it was created in 1985. In October 2004 CPDM leader Paul Biya won re-election as president. The election was flawed by irregularities, particularly in the voter registration process, but observers believed the election results represented the will of the voters. The president retains the power to control legislation or to rule by decree. He has used his legislative control to change the constitution and extend the term lengths of the presidency. Although civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, security forces sometimes acted independently of government authority.

The government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous human rights abuses. Security forces committed numerous unlawful killings; they regularly engaged in torture, beatings, and other abuses, particularly of detainees and prisoners. Impunity was a problem in the security forces. Prison conditions were harsh and life-threatening. Authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained anglophone citizens advocating secession, local human rights monitors and activists, and other citizens. The law provides for the arrest of homosexuals and persons not carrying identification cards. There were reports of prolonged and sometimes incommunicado pretrial detention and infringement on citizens' privacy rights. The government restricted citizens' freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and harassed journalists. The government also impeded citizens' freedom of movement. The public perceived government corruption to be a serious problem. Societal violence and discrimination against women; trafficking in persons, primarily children; discrimination against indigenous Pygmies and ethnic minorities; and discrimination against homosexuals were problems. The government restricted worker rights and the activities of independent labor organizations, and child labor, slavery, and forced labor, including forced child labor, were reported to be problems.

Poor understanding of human rights has contributed to abuses in the country. The government took significant steps during the year to improve citizen's understanding of their specific human rights and protection through publication of its own human rights report. The government also conducted training sessions throughout the country on the provisions of the penal code scheduled for implementation in 2007.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including

Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that government agents committed politically motivated killings; however, throughout the year security forces continued to commit unlawful killings, including killings resulting from beatings and other use of excessive force.

There were new developments in the 2004 killing of John Khontem. On April 12, the Ngoketunjia High Instance Court sentenced National Assembly member Doh Gah Gwanyin III and each of nine codefendants to 15 years in prison and a $1,000 fine (500,000 CFA francs). Gwanyin filed a motion for bail because of poor health, and, on August 18, the Bamenda Court of Appeals granted him bail.

On November 29, security forces mistakenly shot and killed a man while trying to arrest another person who allegedly participated in a violent demonstration the day before in Maga, Far North Province.

There were reports that police used excessive force to disperse demonstrators, resulting in the deaths of several of them (see section 2.b.).

Prisoners reportedly died in custody during the year due to beatings and abuse by security forces.

There were new developments in the February 2005 torture case of banker Emmanuel Moutombi. The Douala Military Tribunal's investigation yielded the names of those involved in Moutombi's death. On March 21, the tribunal sentenced gendarmerie officers Athanase Domo, Pierre Minkeng Ndjemba, and Jean Mbiakop to 10, nine, and eight years in jail, respectively, on charges of torture that resulted in death. Two other officers, Anatole Clement Banem and Jean-Claude Menanga Ahanda, received 10 and six month sentences, respectively, on violation of instructions charges. The court released two of the codefendants due to lack of evidence. The court also ordered the government to pay $90,000 (44 million CFA francs) in damages to Moutombi's family.

There were new developments in the March 2005 shooting death of Jean-Pierre Mpohede. On October 27, the Kribi High Court sentenced Police Commissioner Japhet Bello Miagougoudom to 15 years in prison and awarded $40,000 (20 million CFA francs) in damages to the victim's family. The court also sentenced Police Inspector Aboubakari Modibo to 10 years in jail but acquitted the seven other codefendants.

There were no new developments in the 2005 police killings of Denis Serge Etoundi, Aurelien Mayouga Noundou, Elvis Sigala Tasama, or Claude Obam Ndoum.

There were no new developments in the 2004 beating death of Emmanuel Song Bahanag or the torture death of Laurent Gougang.

There were no new developments in the 2004 police killings of Justin Abena Ngono or Desire Etoundi.

There were new developments in the 2000 high-profile case of the shooting death of Luc Benoit Bassilekin. On April 27, after a two year suspension, the Douala Military Tribunal resumed hearings on the case. The trial was ongoing at year's end.

There were fewer reports that police used excessive, including deadly, force than in the previous year.

There were fewer incidents where police beat or shot suspects. The government took more steps to investigate and prosecute officers who used excessive force (see section 1.d.).

On February 23, police officer Daniel Ayissi Fouda of the Mbengwi police station in the Northwest Province allegedly shot and killed Elvis Ndengue, a motorcycle taxi driver, after Ndengue refused to transport a young woman who Ayissi Fouda had just arrested to the police station. Ayissi Fouda fled the crime scene. The investigation was ongoing at year's end.

On August 22, the Yaounde district attorney charged Ni John Fru Ndi, chairman of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), with the murder of Gregoire Diboule. Fru Ndi was accused of being responsible for violence that resulted in the death. On May 28, SDF vanguards from Bamenda stormed the party's head office in order to prevent the party's dissenting faction from holding a congress (see section 3). The charges against Fru Ndi were still under investigation at year's end.

During the year mob violence and summary justice against persons suspected of theft and the practice of witchcraft continued to result in deaths and serious injuries. The press reported 43 deaths from beatings and burning, the most ever reported.

Douala, the economic capital, had the highest number of mob "justice" incidents. The mob violence was attributed in part to public frustration over police ineffectiveness and the release without charge of many individuals arrested for serious crimes (see section 1.d.). During the year there was a notable rise in crime, and authorities responded by purchasing 60 vehicles to increase police efficacy. The country has a functional police academy and engaged in training police for neighboring countries.

On January 19, former subjects of Fon Vugah Simon II, the former traditional ruler of Kedjom Keku, a village of Mezam Division in the Northwest Province, beat him to death and then burned his body upon his return to the village after having been deposed two years earlier. They accused him of immorality and destroying their tradition. Shortly after the killing, the gendarmerie arrested 59 persons. Approximately 20 were released and the rest remained in pretrial detention. Hearings began on June 28 and were still ongoing at year's end.

On March 4, a mob burned to death Jean-Pierre Onguene, Serge Toussaint Awa Amougou, and Joseph Cyrille Meba'a, whom they caught stealing in the Yaounde neighborhood of Nsimeyong-Damase. The police initially caught and held the suspects, until a large mob broke into the police station, pulled out the three, and killed them. An investigation was still ongoing at year's end.

On June 2, an angry crowd burned to death Jean Bape, Daniel Fotie, and Clovis Koagne on allegations of theft in various houses of Tchokaong, a village of Mifi Division in the West Province. The gendarmerie was still investigating the case at year's end.

In October 2005 the Meme High Court (Southwest Province) sentenced Police Inspector Stephen Ngu to eight years in prison for beating and burning to death Afuh Bernard Weriwo.

There were no new developments in the 2005 burning deaths of Papi Gosse, Jonas Benang, and an unknown individual in Douala.

There were no new developments in any of the killings by mobs in 2004. There were no new developments in the 2003 appeal of the acquittal of six army officers who were charged with executing nine youths in Bepanda.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year.

There were no developments in the 2005 case of 20 citizens reportedly captured by agents of Equatorial Guinea's government and taken to Equatorial Guinea for alleged crimes.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, there were credible reports that security forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees.

In the majority of cases of torture or abuse, the government rarely investigated or punished any of the officials involved; however, in at least one case during the year, gendarmerie officers accused of torturing a citizen to death in 2005 were detained and investigated (see section 1.a.).

During the year there were no reports that persons in police and gendarmerie custody died as a result of torture.

There were reports that security forces detained persons at specific sites where they tortured and beat detainees. Security forces also reportedly subjected women, children, and elderly persons to abuse.

Numerous international human rights organizations and some prison personnel reported that torture was widespread; however, most reports did not identify the victim because of fear of government retaliation against either the victim or the victim's family. Most victims did not report torture for fear of government reprisal or because of ignorance of, or lack of confidence in, the judicial system.

In Douala's New Bell Prison and other nonmaximum security penal detention centers, prison guards inflicted beatings, and prisoners were reportedly chained or at times flogged in their cells. Authorities administered beatings in temporary holding cells within police or gendarme facilities.

Two forms of physical abuse commonly reported by male detainees were the "bastonnade," where authorities beat the victim on the soles of the feet, and the "balancoire," during which authorities hung victims from a rod with their hands tied behind their backs and beat them, often on the genitals.

Security forces reportedly continued to subject prisoners and detainees to degrading treatment, including stripping them, confining them in severely overcrowded cells, denying them access to toilets or other sanitation facilities, and beating detainees to extract confessions or information about alleged criminals. Pretrial detainees reported that they were sometimes required, under threat of abuse, to pay "cell fees," a bribe paid to prison guards to prevent further abuse.

On June 13, Yaounde police stormed a gathering of students from the University of Yaounde II, who were protesting an unannounced hike in taxi fares. Police, who arrived to disperse the spontaneous demonstration, violently beat and seriously injured many students. They also arrested 50 students, who were later released.

In June officers from the Yaounde antiriot squad beat Wackenhut guard service employee Felix Ahanda and many of his colleagues, who were demonstrating to demand payment of money they alleged the firm owed them. The beating left Ahanda with damaged testes.

According to the French-language news site Afrique Centrale, in August soldiers severely injured and wounded five policemen while trying to free a fellow soldier from police custody by force.

There were no new developments in the 2005 police beatings of Genevieve Toupouwou, Gregoire Angotchou, or Nelson Ndi Nagyinkfu.

There were also no developments in the 2005 incident in which security forces beat and arrested 50 students in Bafoussam, West Province, for participating in an illegal demonstration.

There were no new developments in the 2004 beating of a man named Bikele by police officers, or the 2004 assault and arrest of Epie Nzounkwelle by a local government official.

Security forces physically abused and harassed journalists during the year (see section 2.a.).

There were no reports that security forces sexually abused individuals during the year.

There were no new developments in the 2004 case of sexual abuse of Biloa Ndongo by a gendarmerie mobile unit in the Melen neighborhood of Yaounde.

Illegal immigrants from Nigeria and Chad reported that they were subjected to harsh treatment and imprisonment (see section 5).

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Prisons were seriously overcrowded, unsanitary, and inadequate, especially outside major urban areas. The government did not provide funds to cover serious deficiencies in food, health care, and sanitation, which were common in almost all prisons, including "private prisons" operated by traditional rulers in the north. Prisoners were kept in dilapidated, colonial-era prisons, where the number of inmates was four to five times the intended capacity. According to a 2004 report by the International Center for Prison Studies, published by the Catholic newspaper La Croix, there were 67 prisons for the country's approximately 20,000 detainees.

Overcrowding was exacerbated by the large number of long pretrial detentions.

In 2005, 800 persons were hired and trained to work in the prison system. In 2004 the government shifted responsibility for administering prisons and detention centers and all individuals arrested by security forces from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization to the Ministry of Justice. In addition the government created a human rights body within the Ministry of Justice to monitor abuses in prisons and jails (see section 4).

There were reports that prisoners died due to a lack of medical care.

There were no developments in the March 2005 case of Djabba Bouba, a prisoner in the Douala prison who reportedly starved to death in a Douala prison.

Health and medical care were almost nonexistent in the country's prisons and in its detention cells, which were housed in gendarmeries and police stations. However, while some prisons had medical facilities, they lacked the funds and personnel to administer assistance. Between August 5 and 7, three inmates died at the Kumba prison in the Southwest Province, reportedly from untreated tuberculosis.

Prisoners' families were expected to provide food for their relatives in prison. Douala's New Bell Prison contained seven water taps for a reported 3,500 prisoners, contributing to poor hygiene, illness, and death.

Prison officials reportedly tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners with impunity. Corruption among prison personnel was widespread.

Prisoners sometimes could bribe wardens for special favors or treatment, including temporary freedom. Prisoners in New Bell Prison could pay bribes for more comfortable sleeping arrangements and to avoid doing prison chores.

There were two separate prisons for women.

There were also a few pretrial detention centers for women; however, women routinely were held in police and gendarmerie complexes with men, occasionally in the same cells. The secretary of state in charge of penitentiary administration acknowledged this was a serious problem. Mothers sometimes chose to be incarcerated with their children or babies while their children were very young or if they had no other child care option.

Juvenile prisoners were often incarcerated with adults, occasionally in the same cells or wards. There were credible reports that adult inmates sexually abused juvenile prisoners.

Pretrial detainees routinely were held in cells with convicted criminals.

Some high-profile prisoners were separated from other prisoners and enjoyed relatively lenient treatment.

Authorities held adults, juveniles, and women together in temporary detention centers. Detainees usually received no food, water, or medical care. Detention center guards at times resorted to corruption, accepting bribes from detainees in return for access to better conditions, including permission to stay in an office instead of a cell. Detainees whose families were informed of their incarceration relied on their relatives for food and medical care. Overcrowding was common in the detention centers and was often aggravated by the practice of "Friday arrests" (see section 1.d.).

In the North and Extreme North provinces, the government continued to permit traditional chiefs, or Lamibe, to detain persons outside the government penitentiary system, in effect creating private prisons. Traditional rulers throughout the country derive support and legitimacy from their subjects, many of whom turn to the Lamibe for dispute resolution. Within the palaces of the traditional chiefdoms of Rey Bouba, Gashiga, Bibemi, and Tcheboa there were private prisons that had a reputation for serious abuse. Prior to the destruction of the palace prison in 2005 in Garoua, in the North Province, palace staff estimated that a total of 50 prisoners were held in the palace prison annually, normally for one to two weeks.

Individuals who were found guilty in Garoua were reportedly often beaten or subject to other forms of physical abuse. According to members of all the chiefdoms' palace staffs, individuals accused of serious crimes such as murder were turned over to local police.

The government permitted international humanitarian organizations access to prisoners. Both the local Red Cross and the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) made infrequent, unannounced prison visits during the year. The government continued to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons. In 2005 the ICRC stated that the government allowed international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increased access to prisons.

In July 2005, during a visit by diplomatic observers to the Douala New Bell Prison, the prison administrator said that the prison, built to hold 700 inmates, held 3,194. Of these, 2,300 were pretrial detainees, who were not held separate from convicted prisoners. In August 2005, during a similar visit to the Yaounde Kondengui Prison, the same observers learned that the prison, built for 800 inmates, held 3,521 of whom were awaiting trial. In May 2004 a senior official estimated that 1,600 out of 1,800 inmates in Bafoussam Prison were pretrial detainees.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The national police, the National Intelligence Service (DGRE), the gendarmerie, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, the army's military security department, the army, the minister of defense, and, to a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard are responsible for internal security; the national police and gendarmerie have primary responsibility for law enforcement. The Ministry of Defense, including the gendarmerie, national police, and DGRE, are under an office of the presidency, resulting in strong presidential control of security forces. The national police includes the public security force, judicial police, territorial security forces, and frontier police. In rural areas, where there is little or no police presence, the primary law enforcement body is the gendarmerie.

Citizens viewed police as ineffective, which frequently resulted in mob "justice" (see section 1.a.). It was widely believed that individuals paid bribes to law enforcement and the judiciary to secure their freedom. Police officers and members of the gendarmerie were widely viewed as corrupt officials who frequently and arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Police demanded bribes at checkpoints, and influential citizens reportedly paid police to make arrests or abuse individuals involved in personal disputes. Private disputes, such as feuds between business partners, frequently resulted in one party making allegations of impropriety or homosexuality about the other and involving the security forces.

According to Transparency International's 2005 Global Corruption Barometer, citizens viewed the police as extremely corrupt. Impunity remained a problem but was less severe than in previous years. Insufficient funding and inadequate training contributed to a lack of professionalism in the national police. The Center Province purchased 150 police vehicles to improve police effectiveness.

Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo'o, who in 2004 was appointed the general delegate for national security, took significant steps during the year to investigate, suspend, and prosecute security forces accused of abuses.

In 2005 Mebe Ngo'o rehabilitated the "police of the police," an internal affairs unit of undercover agents that had been dormant for many years. By year's end the unit was functioning and had received funding, although there were no public reports of any cases investigated by this unit.

During the year Mebe Ngo'o also sanctioned at least 17 police officials who violated laws and regulations, including those on corruption and extortion. Seven others were also sanctioned by the courts.

For example, on March 2, pending legal action, Mebe Ngo'o suspended three police commissioners for three months without pay for intimidation and aggravated corruption. On September 4, the president signed decrees terminating them from the police force, and revoking their pension rights. On August 21, Mebe Ngo'o suspended eight police officers for three months without pay who were involved in the trafficking of ordinary passports.

In March 2005 Mebe Ngo'o suspended a Douala police officer and a Yaounde police inspector for three months for behavior that "tarnished the image of the police." He suspended another Yaounde-based police inspector for two weeks for keeping a citizen's driving license unnecessarily.

During the year courts convicted at least seven police and gendarmerie officers for human rights abuses.

On May 15, the Douala prosecutor detained four police officers

from the Douala Central Police Station No. 2 for the theft of $2,000 (one million CFA francs) seized from a thief who had stolen the money from a shop. In June the Bafoussam tribunal sentenced a police inspector from the Foumban police station to one year in jail, a $400 fine (200,000 CFA francs), and $300 in damages (150,000 CFA francs) to be paid to Raoul Noka for the 2003 suit that his lawyer filed against him for the nonpayment of his legal fees. On August 4, the Yaounde High Court sentenced a gendarmerie commissioned officer to 18 months in jail for the 2005 murder of his young neighbor.

On August 23, the Bamenda Court sentenced the Bamenda judicial police commissioner to pay damages of $1,200 (600,000 CFA francs) to Edwin Nkwain Mbang for arbitrarily arresting and detaining him for 18 days in 2001.

In May 2005 the Douala Military Tribunal sentenced two police inspectors from the Douala Central Police Station No. 1 to six months in jail for the 2001 armed assault and robbery of three Nigerian citizens.

The government also took actions to reform security forces including the police and gendarmerie. On June 22, several gendarmerie and police officers completed a four-week training seminar on order preservation, with an emphasis on citizens' rights, human rights, and individual freedoms. The government also sent candidates to attend the International Law Enforcement Academy police training.

Arrest and Detention

The law requires police to obtain an arrest warrant except when a person is caught in the act of committing a crime. Police legally may detain a person in connection with a common crime for up to 24 hours and may renew the detention three times before bringing charges. While this provision was generally respected, there were unverifiable reports that police occasionally violated it.

The law provides for the right to judicial review of the legality of detention only in the country's two anglophone provinces, and this provision was respected in practice. In the francophone provinces, French legal tradition applies, precluding judicial authorities from acting on a case until the authority that ordered the detention turns the case over to a prosecutor. In practice these processes took between 15 days to a month. In francophone provinces, after a magistrate has issued a warrant to bring a case to trial he may hold the detainee in administrative or pretrial detention indefinitely, pending court action. During the year such detention often was prolonge, due to the understaffed and mismanaged court system. The law permits detention without charge by administrative authorities such as governors and senior divisional officers for renewable periods of 15 days, ostensibly to combat banditry and maintain public order. Persons taken into detention frequently were denied access to both legal counsel and family members. The law permits release on bail only in the anglophone provinces; bail was granted infrequently.

To prepare for the new Code on Criminal Procedure scheduled to enter into force in January 2007, the Ministry of Justice organized training sessions on the code in each of the country's 10 provinces. The code extends the right of individuals to be released on bail to the whole country. It also allows those arrested and held in police and gendarmerie facilities for investigation to be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of their detention.

Police and gendarmes often arrested persons on spurious charges on Fridays at mid-day or in the afternoon. While the law in the anglophone provinces provides for judicial review of an arrest within 24 hours, the courts did not convene on weekends, so individuals arrested on a Friday typically remained in detention until Monday at the earliest. Police and gendarmes made such "Friday arrests" after accepting bribes from persons who had private grievances. There were no known cases of policemen or gendarmes being sanctioned or punished for this practice.

Security forces and government authorities reportedly continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, often holding them for prolonged periods without charges or trial and, at times, incommunicado.

There were reports of political detainees, including anglophone citizens advocating secession, local human rights monitors or activists, journalists, and other critics of the government (see sections 2.a. and 2.b.).

Police also arrested persons during unauthorized demonstrations, invariably releasing them within a few hours unless they engaged in violence (see section 2.b.).

During the year security forces preemptively arrested approximately 70 leaders, members, and supporters of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), an anglophone secessionist group (see section 3).

There were no developments in the 2005 trial of three SCNC members charged with disturbing the public order.

On April 2, gendarmes of the Center Province town of Bokito arrested and detained Suzanne Binyom and Felicite Atchang for 24 hours at the request of Ernest Oloume, the ruling party deputy from the locality. The women had come to pay a courtesy call on their parliamentarian. Olouma told the gendarmes that the women looked suspicious; they in turn filed a complaint for arbitrary arrest and detention.

On April 17, gendarmes from the Yaounde-Kondengui brigade arrested and briefly detained Alice Nkom, a prominent Douala-based lawyer. She was visiting her clients, alleged homosexuals who had been awaiting trial for several months, in the Yaounde central prison. Nkom took some pictures of her clients but was prevented from continuing by prison wardens, who claimed she had no right to take pictures. Nkom told them that there was no law prohibiting her actions. Unable to cite a law backing their claim, prison officials called the gendarmes to have Nkom removed.

On September 15, Police Commissioner Mve of the Douala judicial police office ordered the arrest and detention of Conrad Mongue-Din, a Douala-based lawyer. Mongue-Din went to the judicial police office to assist a client. The police commissioner denied his request for access. When Mongue-Din insisted, Commissioner Mve ordered Monque-Din detained, claiming he created a disturbance. Mongue-Din filed a complaint through the Douala branch of the Cameroon Bar Association.

There were no developments in the 2005 arrest of a labor leader during a sit-in (see section 6.a.).

There were no developments in the 2004 arrest of a Human Rights Defense Group member by a Northwest Province chief.

Police frequently arrested persons without identification during sweeps (see section 1.f.). Citizens are required to carry identification with them at all times.

The law provides that detainees must be brought promptly before a magistrate; however, bureaucratic inefficiency and, at times, arbitrary actions led to prolonged pretrial detention, and sometimes persons were held incommunicado for months or even years (see section 1.c.). For example, in 2005, in Douala's New Bell Prison and Yaounde's Kondengui Prison, 5,300 of the 6,715 persons incarcerated were in pretrial detention. This high number was due to many factors, including the complexity of cases, staff shortages, and corruption. The average pretrial detention period ranged from one to five years. Longer detention periods were often linked to the loss of a file and the absence of a lawyer to follow up on the case. In January 2005 the Union of Northwest Human Rights Organizations stated it had visited 20 detainees in the Bamenda Prison who had each been awaiting trial for 10 years.

In 2003 the Ministry of Justice and the European Union launched an assistance program to examine cases of prolonged pretrial detention and resolve them. The program was still ongoing at year's end; however, the lack of personnel impeded its effectiveness.

There was no information available on Barnabe Atangana or Beniot Bilongo, who remained in pretrial detention at the end of the year after 22 years and nine years, respectively.

The law specifies that, after an investigation has concluded, juveniles should not be detained without trial for longer than three months; however, in practice the government detained juveniles for longer periods of time. For example, at the end of 2004, Michel Sighanou, a juvenile who was transferred from the Yabassi prison to another prison in 1996, had been awaiting trial for more than seven years. No additional information was available at year's end.

In recent years there have been reports that some prisoners were kept in prison after completing their sentences or having been released under a court ruling. During a July visit to Douala, a Catholic prison chaplain told diplomatic observers that there were still many such cases. Authorities kept more than 100 prisoners in jail past their release dates due to the prisonere's inability to pay court fees or damages.

The government took steps to implement a tracking system that would permit authorities to locate released prisoners and collect fines or damages.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary remained highly subject to executive influence, and corruption and inefficiency remained serious problems. The court system was subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, which was part of the presidency. A constitutional anomaly names the president as "first magistrate," thus "chief" of the judiciary and the theoretical arbiter of any sanctions against the judiciary, which could influence judicial action. In practice, however, the president has not filled this role. The constitution specifies that the president is the guarantor of the legal system's independence. He also appoints all judges with the advice of the Supreme Council of the Magistrature. Some politically sensitive cases were never heard by the courts. However, the judiciary showed modest signs of growing independence. During the year the courts found the government liable for damages in a few human rights cases involving abuses by security officers. For example, in the Miagougoudom case, the government awarded the victim's family $40,000 (20 million CFA francs) in damages (see section 1.a.).

The court system includes the Supreme Court, a court of appeals in each of the 10 provinces, and courts of first instance in each of the country's 58 divisions.

The legal system includes both national and customary law, and many criminal and civil cases can be tried using either one. However, criminal cases are generally tried in statutory courts, and customary court convictions involving witchcraft automatically are transferred to the statutory courts, which act as the Court of First Instance. Customary law, which is used most frequently in rural areas, is based upon the traditions of the ethnic group predominant in the region and is adjudicated by traditional authorities of that group. Customary law is deemed valid only when it is not "repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience." However, many citizens in rural areas remained unaware of their rights under civil law and were taught that they must abide by customary laws. Customary law ostensibly provides for equal rights and status; however, men may limit women's rights regarding inheritance and employment, and some traditional legal systems treat wives as the legal property of their husbands.

Customary courts served as a primary means for settling civil disputes in rural areas, primarily in family-related civil cases, such as in matters of succession, inheritance, and child custody. Divorce cases can be brought to customary courts only if the government has not sanctioned the marriage through an official license. Customary courts may exercise jurisdiction in a civil case only with the consent of both parties. Either party has the right to have a case heard by a statutory court and to appeal an adverse decision by a customary court to the statutory courts. Most traditional courts also permitted appeal of their decisions to traditional authorities of higher rank.

The legal structure is strongly influenced by the French legal system, although in the two anglophone provinces certain aspects of the Anglo-Saxon tradition apply. In the past this mixed legal tradition led to conflicting court action in cases handled in both francophone and anglophone jurisdictions.

During the year the government approved a new Criminal Procedure Code and conducted training on the code throughout the country, in anticipation of its implementation in 2007.

Trial Procedures

The law provides for a fair public hearing in which the defendant is presumed innocent. However, this provision often was not respected. There is no jury system. Defendants have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner. Defendants generally were allowed to question witnesses and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Defendants also had access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Because appointed attorneys received little compensation, the quality of legal representation for indigent clients often was poor. The bar association and some voluntary organizations, such as the Cameroonian Association of Female Jurists, offered free assistance in some cases. The Project for the Improvement of Conditions of Detention continued to engage lawyers to work on prison cases. Trials normally were public, except in cases judged by the Ministry of Justice to have political overtones or to be disruptive to social peace. In practice defendants enjoyed a presumption of innocence and exercised their right to appeal their cases.

There were reports that officials continued to hold individuals in prison beyond the jail terms set by the courts. In 2005 the general prosecutor of the Yaounde Superior Court reviewed the files of approximately 150 prisoners at the Kondengui Prison to check their judicial status.

Political bias by judges (often instructed by the government) often stopped trials or resulted in an extremely long process with extended court recesses. Powerful political or business interests enjoyed virtual immunity from prosecution; some politically sensitive cases were settled through bribes.

Military tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over civilians when the president declares martial law and in cases involving civil unrest or organized armed violence. Military tribunals also have jurisdiction over gang crimes, banditry, and highway robbery. The government interpreted these guidelines broadly and sometimes used military courts to try matters concerning dissident groups.

Military trials were subject to irregularities and political influence.

Political Prisoners

During the year authorities continued to hold two groups of prisoners who could be considered political prisoners.

There were no developments in the case of 15 members of the secessionist group SCNC serving long prison sentences following their 1999 convictions in military trials. Their trials and convictions did not meet international or national legal standards; Amnesty International and other international human rights NGOs criticized the trials as unfair. In addition the military tribunal admitted into evidence confessions that were credibly alleged in court to have been exacted under torture.

The prisoners maintained they were political prisoners convicted for supporting a political belief; however, the government claimed they were imprisoned for acts of violence against government offices and officers. The government permitted access to the prisoners on a regular basis by international humanitarian organizations.

Because it advocates succession the government considered the SCNC an illegal organization and refused to register it as a political organization.

During the year the government continued to hold two individuals widely considered by human rights NGOs to be political prisoners because of irregularities in their trials and restricted access to counsel. Titus Edzoa, former minister of health and long-time aide to President Biya, and Michel Thierry Atangana, Edzoa's 1997 campaign manager, were arrested in 1997, three months after Edzoa resigned from government and launched his candidacy for president. They were convicted on charges of embezzling public funds and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution and law prohibit such actions; however, these rights were subject to the "higher interests of the state," and there were numerous, credible reports that police and gendarmes harassed citizens, conducted searches without warrants, and opened or seized mail with impunity. The government continued to keep some opposition activists and dissidents under surveillance. Police sometimes punished family members and neighbors of criminal suspects.

The law permits a police officer to enter a private home during daylight hours without a warrant if he is pursuing an inquiry and has reason to suspect that a crime has been committed. The officer must have a warrant to make such a search after dark; however, a police officer may enter a private home at any time in pursuit of a criminal observed committing a crime.

During the year police put the houses of SCNC officials and activists under surveillance, searched the houses of some SCNC leaders, and disrupted SCNC meetings in private residences (see section 3).

An administrative authority may authorize police to conduct neighborhood sweeps without warrants. Such sweeps at times involved forced entry into homes in search of suspected criminals or stolen or illegal goods. Security forces sometimes sealed off a neighborhood, systematically searched homes, arrested persons, sometimes arbitrarily, and seized suspicious or illegal articles.

In 2005 there were credible reports that security forces in Douala and Yaounde used such sweeps as a pretext to loot homes and arbitrarily arrest persons for minor offenses, such as not possessing identity cards. For example, in June 2005 the Douala police, accompanied by gendarmes and soldiers, conducted a sweep in the Douala neighborhoods of Bonakuamouang, Bessengue Valley, and Bessengue, and arrested approximately 100 individuals, mostly young men and women. Police held them in a Douala police station until their identity was established, a process that took 24 hours.

Citizens without ID cards were detained until their identity could be established and then released. Several complained of the police's arbitrary seizure (theft) of electronic devices and cell phones, and registered their complaints at the police station.

There continued to be accusations, particularly in the North and Far North provinces, that traditional chiefs arbitrarily evicted persons from their land.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and while the government continued to restrict these rights in practice, media groups were vibrant and active.

The government sometimes invoked strong libel laws to silence criticism of the government and officials. Journalists, particularly broadcast journalists, often practiced self censorship as a result of real or expected government intimidation, harassment, and criminal penalties for speech-related offenses.

Individuals generally were able to criticize the government publicly and privately without being subjected to government reprisal, although the country's strict libel law resulted in self-censorship. However, the government prohibited discussion or advocacy of secession, which resulted in numerous arrests of SCNC members during the year (see section 3).

On May 12, the Yaounde administrative authorities pressured the Cameroon Episcopal Conference to cancel a press conference where it was to present its final report for the 2004 presidential election. The Justice and Peace Committee, which organized the conference, finally cancelled it.

On September 1, the Sous-prefet of Yaounde I banned opposition leader Woungly Massaga's press conference on an electoral reform plan based on a project by the Catholic Church. The Sous-prefet asserted that Woungly Massaga could not hold the conference because he failed to demonstrate that the Catholic Church authorized him to endorse its project. A week later, the Sous-prefet of Yaounde III banned a press conference by Massaga in that locale on the same grounds.

On September 19, the Sous-prefet of Yaounde I banned a meeting that Nouveaux Droits de l'Homme, a democracy and human rights NGO, organized at the Chamber of Agriculture. Droits de l'Homme wanted to launch a "National Forum of Civil Society on Elections," to discuss electoral reform and the creation of an independent electoral body that would govern all elections. In his ban order, the Sous-prefet asserted that he did not understand the real purpose of the meeting.

The government published one of the country's few daily newspapers, the Cameroon Tribune. The newspaper did not report extensively on protests or political parties critical of the government, overtly criticize the ruling party, or portray government programs in an unfavorable light.

During the year approximately 200 privately owned newspapers were published; however, only an estimated 25 were published on a regular basis, primarily for lack of funding. Mutations, La Nouvelle Expression, and Le Messager were the only privately owned daily newspapers. Newspapers were distributed primarily in urban areas, and most continued to criticize the government and report on controversial issues, including corruption, human rights abuses, homosexuality, and economic policies. However, the government used criminal libel laws to inhibit the press by criminalizing the propagation of false information.

Despite the large number of private newspapers in the country, the influence of print media was minimal. Distribution was problematic outside of major towns, and prices of independent newspapers were high, due largely to high government taxes on newsprint.

In 2004 the government established a special fund to support the development of the press, particularly newspapers, and funds were disbursed to some private newspapers and radio stations. The government continued to disburse such funds during the year. According to media reports, funding was awarded very selectively, and some media outlets, such as Mutations and Radio Reine, refused to apply for funds. The government exerted control over some newspaper warehouses and seized editions of controversial newspaper editions prior to distribution or after they were released.

The government tightly controlled the broadcast media. Radio remained the most important medium reaching most citizens. There were approximately 20 privately owned radio stations operating in the country. Approximately 75 percent of private radio stations were concentrated in Yaounde and Douala. Ownership of the private radio stations was very diverse, with only one owner having more than one station. The state owned CRTV broadcast on both television and radio and was the only officially recognized and fully licensed broadcaster in the country. The government levied taxes on all registered taxpaying citizens to finance CRTV programming, which allowed CRTV a distinct advantage over independent broadcasters.

Nonprofit rural radio stations were required to submit an application to broadcast but were exempt from paying licensing fees. Potential commercial radio and television broadcasters must submit a licensing application and pay an application fee when the application is submitted. Once the license is issued, stations must then pay an annual licensing fee, which can be expensive. Although the government had not issued new broadcast licenses in many years, companies operated without them.

During the year the National Communications Council (NCC), whose members were appointed by the president, continued to review all broadcasting license applications, the first step in issuing licenses. In addition a technical committee composed of government-appointed members--including government officials, journalists, and jurists--continued to review the NCC's decisions.

There were no developments in the 2005 case of the closure of Lake Side Independent Radio for broadcasting without a license.

There were several low-power, rural community radio stations with extremely limited broadcast range that were funded by the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and foreign countries. The government prohibited these stations--which broadcast programs on education, health, the environment, and development to small audiences--from discussing politics.

The law permits broadcasting by foreign news services but requires them to partner with a national station. The BBC, Radio France International, and other foreign services broadcast in partnership with state-owned CRTV.

Television was less pervasive but more influential than print media. The five independent television stations largely avoided criticizing the government, although their news broadcasts sometimes focused on poverty, unemployment, poor education, and government neglect, and corruption which the broadcasts said had caused these problems.

Like the Cameroon Tribune, CRTV provided broad reporting of CPDM activities, while giving relatively little attention to the political opposition. During the year CRTV management continued to instruct staff repeatedly to ensure that government views prevailed at all times.

Security forces, usually acting under the command of local provincial government officials, reportedly continued to restrict press freedom by arresting, detaining, physically abusing, threatening, and otherwise harassing journalists.

On January 3, gendarmes from the Douala neighborhood of Bonaberi attacked Pius Njawe, a journalist and the publisher of Le Messager newspaper. Njawe was driving his car on the Wouri bridge in Douala when he witnessed a car accident. He stopped to take pictures, but the investigating gendarmes barred him from doing so. When Njawe insisted, the gendarmes beat and kicked him, finally pushing him back into his car. Njawe did not file a complaint against the gendarme officers.

On September 3, officers from the Yaounde military security agency (Semil) arrested and detained Duke Atangana Etotogo, publisher of the monthly L'Afrique Centrale, without a warrant and seized magazine copies that were on sale. Etotogo published a series of analytical reports on the armed forces and their leadership. The purpose of the arrest was to force him to reveal his sources. Semil released Etotogo after five days of intensive interrogation. Before his release on September 7, the military security agency demanded that Etotogo write a letter of apology to the president, who is the supreme chief of the armed forces, which he did.

According to the NGO Committee to Protect Journalists in April Eric Motomu, editor of The Chronicle, was beaten unconscious by the bodyguard and driver of opposition leader John Fru Ndi. Motomu said he was treated for head and chest injuries. Earlier, Motomu had been summoned by police in Bamenda in connection with a defamation case brought against him by Fru Ndi. However, Motomu was not formally charged.

On November 6, Sweet FM radio presenter Agnes Taile was attacked by three hooded intruders, who forced their way into Taile's home in Douala, dragged her outside, beat her, and tried to strangle her. She was hospitalized with multiple injuries. Authorities had not made any arrests by year's end.

There were no developments in the 2005 police beatings of journalists Philip Njaru and Innocent Yuh, who were hospitalized from their wounds. There were also no developments in the 2005 case of broadcasters Freedom FM and Radio Oku, which were both closed by government officials.

There were no reports that the government indirectly censored the media by controlling advertising revenues. Since the government was the largest advertiser in the country, however, and could choose which media outlets to pay to place advertising, it continued to have a certain degree of influence over media outlets.

The government prosecuted its critics in the print media through criminal libel laws. These laws authorize the government, at its discretion and the request of the plaintiff, to criminalize a civil libel suit or to initiate a criminal libel suit in cases of alleged libel against the president and other high government officials; such crimes are punishable by prison terms and heavy fines. The libel law places the burden of proof on the defendant. Local leaders in particular abused this law to keep local reporters from reporting on corruption and abusive behavior. Various government members and senior government officials filed nine libel suits against journalists.

On March 3, a Yaounde court sentenced Jean-Pierre Amougou Belinga, publisher of the Yaounde-based weekly L'Anecdote, to four months in jail on defamation charges. In February Belinga published a list of alleged homosexuals, which included Gregoire Owona, a government member, who filed a libel suit. The court ruling found only that the publisher could not substantiate his claim. The court fined Belinga $2,000 (one million CFA francs) and ordered him to pay symbolic damages to the plaintiff and publish the ruling in several newspapers. Similar suits were filed by Owona and by Jean-Pierre Mayo, the general manager of the Yaounde-based National Social Insurance Fund hospital, against Biloa Ayissi, publisher of the Yaounde-based weekly Nouvelle Afrique. In the Owona case, the court sentenced Ayissi on March 24 to six months in jail for defamation, fined him $2,000 (one million CFA francs), ordered him to pay symbolic damages to the plaintiff and to publish the ruling in several newspapers and some electronic media. In the Mayo case, the court ordered Ayissi to pay $6,000 (three million CFA francs) in damages.

The other journalists whom courts convicted on defamation charges in private cases included Dieudonne Mveng, publisher of the weekly newspaper La Meteo, Socrate Dipanda, publisher of the weekly Le Constat, Peter William Mandio, publisher of the weekly Le Front, Henriette Ekwe, columnist with Le Front, and Georges Gilbert Baongla, publisher of the weekly Le Dementi. Most received suspended prison sentences. None of the journalists sentenced to prison terms were sent to prison.

There were no developments in the April 2005 defamation case against Guibai Gatema and Abdoulaye Oumate.

There were no developments in the 2005 libel case against Le Jeune Observateur publisher Jules Koum Koum.

There were no developments in the 2004 case of Eric Wirkwa Tayu, convicted of defamation.

In March 2005 the Union of Cameroonian Journalists created the Cameroon Media Council (CMC), an independent, self-regulating body of journalists aiming to promote press freedom, access to information, professionalism, and ethical reporting. The CMC, supported by the minister of communication, also had as part of its mission the goal of reviewing and disciplining media professionals and arbitrating complaints against journalists. Complaints included ethical breeches, such as the common practice for newspaper reporters and editors of accepting payments from politicians and businessmen to write articles containing unsubstantiated allegations against the opponents and competitors of their benefactors.

Internet Freedom

There were no reports that the government attempted to monitor the Internet. There were also no reports that the government restricted access to the Internet. The Internet was available and used by citizens, although access was limited by cost and slow connections.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

Although there were no legal restrictions on academic freedom, state security informants reportedly operated on university campuses. Professors said that participation in opposition political parties could adversely affect their professional opportunities and advancement. During the year strikes in the state universities of Yaounde I, Yaounde II, and Douala deteriorated and resulted in violent confrontations between students and security forces (see section 2.b.).

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The law provides for freedom of assembly; however, the government restricted this right in practice.

The law requires organizers of public meetings, demonstrations, or processions to notify officials in advance but does not require prior government approval of public assemblies and does not authorize the government to suppress public assemblies that it has not approved in advance. However, officials routinely have asserted that the law implicitly authorized the government to grant or deny permission for public assembly. Consequently, the government often did not grant permits for assemblies organized by persons or groups critical of the government and repeatedly used force to suppress public assemblies for which it had not issued permits.

Security forces forcibly disrupted the demonstrations, meetings, and rallies of citizens, trade unions, and groups of political activists throughout the year.

On numerous occasions throughout the year, authorities refused to grant the SCNC, an unregistered political group the government deemed illegal because it advocated secession, permission to hold rallies and meetings, and security forces arrested and detained some activists (see section 3).

On March 9, Douala gendarmes disrupted a gathering of Manifeste Africain pour la Nouvelle Independence et la Democratie (MANIDEM), an opposition party, although the party claimed it had received tacit approval for the meeting from the competent administrative authority. Some benches were broken in the altercation, but MANIDEM resumed its meeting after the gendarmerie group commander intervened and called his subordinates to order.

Police forcibly dispersed student demonstrators during the year, which resulted in deaths and injuries. For example, on June 13, Yaounde police dispersed a gathering from the University of Yaounde II and arrested 50 students (see section 1.c.). The rector filed suits against some of the students.

On August 4, the Yaounde First Instance Court began hearings on the cases of four leaders of the Association for the Defense of Students' Interests (ADDEC)--Ibrahim Mohaman, Rodrigue Batogna, Messi Bela, and Tememou--in connection with charges of rebellion and disturbance of public order. The trial was ongoing at year's end.

On November 29, the Buea antiriot police shot and killed two students, Ufeanei Ivo Abiandong and Bennett Moma Kenyufon, while dispersing a demonstration at the University of Buea. The students were protesting those admitted to the faculty of medicine because the protesters believed the minister of higher education had tampered with the names on the admission's list. An investigation was ongoing at year's end.

On December 21, Foumban gendarmes shot and killed Issah Njifouh, a night watchman, during a demonstration in Njinka Chiefdom in Foumban. The demonstrators were protesting the government's decision to replace Adamou Ndam Njoya, an opposition leader and traditional ruler of their chiefdom, with another person. An investigation was still ongoing at year's end.

The Yaounde First Instance Court sentenced students to prison terms during the year in connection with events that occurred in 2005.

On April 11, the Yaounde First Instance Court sentenced Thierry Okala Ebode, a leader of the ADDEC, to a suspended six month jail term (which could be imposed at any time over the next three years if arrested on similar charges) on charges of rebellion and disturbance of public order. In November 2005 ADDEC had organized a meeting on the campus of the University of Yaounde I to discuss issues that made students' lives difficult. The university rector reportedly called the gendarmes to break up the meeting. This resulted in clashes between the gerndarmes and the students, of whom many were arrested. There were no developments in the 2005 killing of two University of Buea students by security forces.

There were no reports that security forces broke up or disrupted gatherings of the SDF during the year. However, administrative authorities banned marches and meetings that the SDF wanted to conduct in Douala and Limbe. For example, on July 4, the Sous-prefet of Douala I banned a march organized by the SDF to protest the pauperization of citizens. The Sous-prefet justified the ban by claiming the march might disturb public order. On October 13, the Sous-prefet of Limbe banned a meeting of the National Executive Committee of the SDF on the grounds that internal fighting might disrupt public order.

Freedom of Association

The law provides for freedom of association, but the government limited this right in practice.

The conditions for government recognition of a political party, a prerequisite for many political activities, precluded peaceful advocacy of secession. While more than 180 political parties, together with a large and growing number of civic associations, operated legally, the government continued to refuse to register the SCNC as a political party and harassed and arrested its leaders and members (see section 3).

c. Freedom of Religion

The law provides for freedom of religion and the government generally respected this right in practice; however, there were a few exceptions.

Religious groups must be approved and registered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization to function legally. Although there were no reports that the government refused to register any group, the process usually took several years, due primarily to administrative delays. The government did not register traditional religious groups on the grounds that the practice of traditional religion was a private concern observed by members of a particular ethnic or kinship group or the residents of a particular locality.

There were no further developments in the January 2004 arrest and detention of Michel Atanga Effa and Gervais Balla for the 2003 murder of a priest or in the May 2004 beating of Pastor Alombah Godlove by the traditional ruler of his village.

The practice of witchcraft is a criminal offense under the law; however, individuals generally were prosecuted for this offense only in conjunction with another offense, such as murder. Witchcraft traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of unknown cause.

Societal Abuses and Discrimination

There were occasionally reports of discrimination in the northern provinces, particularly in rural areas, by Muslims against Christians and persons who practiced traditional indigenous religions. However, the overall amicable relationship among religious groups in society contributed to religious freedom.

The size of the Jewish community was very small, and there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2006 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The constitution and law provide for these rights; however, security forces routinely impeded domestic travel during the year.

Roadblocks and checkpoints manned by security forces proliferated in cities and on most highways, making road travel both time-consuming and costly. Extortion of small bribes was commonplace at these checkpoints. Police frequently stopped travelers to check identification documents, vehicle registrations, and tax receipts as security and immigration control measures. There were no reports that security forces killed individuals suspected of evading checkpoints. However, there were credible reports that police arrested and beat individuals who failed to carry their identification cards as required by law.

The law prohibits forced exile, and the government did not use it; however, some human rights monitors or political opponents who considered themselves threatened by the government left the country voluntarily and declared themselves to be in political exile.

In 2005 the government, the Nigerian High Commission to Cameroon, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed a tripartite agreement for the voluntary repatriation of 10,000 of the 17,000 Nigerian Fulani cattle breeders who fled their homes in 2001 to escape ethnic fighting. During the year a large number of Nigerians returned home.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

In March 2005 between 10,000 and 15,000 citizens in and around the Adamawa Province villages of Djohong and Ngaoui were displaced following attacks and looting by unidentified armed groups from the Central African Republic (CAR).

According to the Adamawa Province's governor, the groups targeted cattle herders of the M'bororo ethnic group, kidnapping them and demanding ransom due to the group's perceived wealth. The government reportedly sent troops in 2005 to restore order in the border area, and during the year a rapid intervention unit operated in the area.

During the year the government worked with the UNHCR to protect and assist IDPs.

Protection of Refugees

The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, and the government has established a system of providing protection to refugees. In practice, the government provided protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution, and granted refugee status or asylum. In 2005 the National Assembly passed legislation that formally established the status of refugees, and the president signed it into law in July 2005.

The government also provided protection to certain individuals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol. At year's end the UNHCR estimated that the country provided temporary protection to approximately 17,500 refugees, the majority of whom were Chadian and Nigerian, in addition to 5,300 asylum seekers, some of whom were economic refugees presenting themselves as political victims.

During the year, as a result of numerous attacks and kidnappings by unidentified armed groups in the CAR, approximately 20,000 members of the M'bororo ethnic group reportedly fled to the country, according to UN agencies and local human rights groups, bringing the total number of refugees to 35,083. In June the UNHCR reported that 20,383 M'bororos from CAR settled near the CAR border, with approximately 13,000 in the East Province and 7,000 in Adamoua. There were also 2,948 Nigerian refugees in Banyo (Adamaoua and Northwest provinces) and 11,752 urban refugees in Yaounde and Douala.

The government cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers. The government has been tolerant and understanding of CAR and Chadian citizens coming across the borders to flee their countries, facilitating their entry and providing assistance.

A special task force, including troops from the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (comprised of Cameroon, Gabon, CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, and Chad), regularly launched joint operations, with logistical support from the French army, against CAR and Chadian rebels.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The law provides that citizens have the right to change their government peacefully; however, dominance of the political process by the president and his party and electoral intimidation, manipulation, and fraud limited the ability of citizens to exercise this right in past elections.

Elections and Political Participation

In October 2004 President Biya, who has controlled the government since 1982, was re-elected with approximately 70 percent of the vote in an election widely viewed as freer and fairer than previous elections, and in which opposition parties fielded candidates. However, the election was poorly managed and marred by irregularities, in particular in the voting registration process, but most international observers deemed that the irregularities did not prevent the elections from expressing the will of the voters.

Some observers said progress had been made and called the election transparent; others, such as the Commonwealth Observer Group, stated that the election lacked credibility. Some opposition parties alleged that there was multiple voting by individuals close to President Biya's party and massive vote rigging. One domestic group described the election as a masquerade. The 2002 legislative elections, which were dominated by the CPDM, largely reflected the will of the people; however, there were widespread irregularities.

In December the National Elections Observatory published its assessment of the 2004 elections; the assessment cited electoral weakness in voter registration and report collection, recommended that the observatory assume control of voter registration, and called for an increased responsibility for the observatory in organizing elections. The government also established an independent electoral commission.

Since 1991 only government bills proposed by the presidency have been enacted by the National Assembly. However, in March the National Assembly agreed to consider a private member's bill on the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns that an opposition party tabled at the session opening. This consideration followed another one that took place in 2004. Only parties with representatives in the National Assembly can submit bills for consideration. During its June 2005 session, the National Assembly refused to consider a bill on electoral reform tabled by the SDF, the leading parliamentary opposition party.

Members of the Beti ethnic group, including the Bulu subgroup to which the president belongs, figured prominently in the government, civil service, and management of state-owned businesses.

The president's control over the country's administrative apparatus was extensive. The president appoints all ministers, including the prime minister, and also directly appoints the governors of each of the 10 provinces. The president also has the power to appoint important lower level members of the 58 provincial administrative structures.

The right of citizens to choose their local governments remained circumscribed. The government increased greatly the number of municipalities run by presidentially appointed delegates, who have authority over elected mayors. Delegate-run cities included most of the provincial capitals and some division capitals in pro-opposition provinces; however, this practice was almost nonexistent in the southern provinces, which tended to support the ruling CPDM party. In municipalities with elected mayors, local autonomy was limited since elected local governments relied on the central government for most of their revenue and administrative personnel.

There were more than 180 registered political parties in the country. Fewer than 10, however, had significant levels of support, and only five had seats in the National Assembly. The ruling CPDM held an absolute majority in the National Assembly; opposition parties included the SDF, based in the anglophone provinces and some major cities. The largest of the opposition parties were the National Union for Democracy and Progress, the Cameroon Democratic Union, and the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon.

The government considered one unregistered anglophone political group, the SCNC, illegal, because it advocated secession from the country and authorities refused to register it as a political organization. During the year security forces preemptively arrested approximately 70 leaders, members, and supporters of the SCNC; such arrests were conducted to prevent persons from participating in political meetings.

On numerous occasions throughout the year, authorities refused to grant the SCNC permission to hold rallies and meetings. Security forces disrupted SCNC meetings, including in private residences, arresting SCNC activists and releasing them a couple of days later. For example, on April 27, gendarmes arrested 65 SCNC activists in Oku, in the Northwest Province, while they were holding a meeting in a private residence. They were not charged and were released four days later. On May 7, the Bamenda police broke up Hitler Mbinglo Humphrey's press conference in the Musang-Rendez-vous neighborhood, arresting Mbinglo Humphrey and three others. The police subsequently arrested 17 other activists who protested the arrest of their leaders. They were released after a brief detention.

In August SDF Chairman Fru Ndi was accused of being responsible for violence that resulted in the death (see section 1.a.).

On September 16, gendarmes from the Bamenda gendarmerie legion in the Northwest Province arrested five SCNC activists in their office: Fidelis Tchenkwo, Emmanuel Enu, Prescilla Khan, Elvis Bandzeka, and Cletus She. They were released after a brief detention. The SCNC claimed that the arrests were to prevent the activists from preparing and holding a meeting of the "Northern Zone."

On September 19, the Prefect of Mezam Division in the Northwest Province signed an order banning all public meetings, rallies, or gatherings of more than four persons and prohibiting access to electronic media for any SCNC official or sympathizer.

On October 1, security forces arrested and detained some activists in the Northwest and Southwest provinces for activities such as raising an SCNC flag in a public market place. They were released after a few days' detention.

On October 1, the Bamenda police blocked access to radio and television stations, put the houses of SCNC officials and activists under surveillance, and searched the houses of some SCNC leaders, including Chief Ayamba Ette, the SCNC chairman, Nfor Ngalla Nfor, the vice president, and Binlo Hitler, the president of the Northern Zone.

In advance of the annual celebration of Southern Cameroon "independence" on October 1, the government engaged in a campaign of closing down SCNC rallies and meetings.

There were no developments in the 2005 arrests of three SCNC members charged with disturbing the public order.

The government also continued to hold some SCNC activists in temporary detention pending trials.

Women held 18 of 180 seats in the National Assembly, six of 61 cabinet posts, and a few of the higher offices within the major political parties, including the ruling CPDM.

Many of the key members of the government were drawn from the president's Beti/Bulu ethnic group, as were disproportionately large numbers of military officers and CPDM officials. Pygmies were not represented in the National Assembly or the government.

Government Corruption and Transparency

Corruption remained a serious problem in all branches of government. The public perception was that judicial and administrative officials were open to bribes in almost all situations. According to a Transparency International survey published in December 2005, an average household paid $205 (113,000 CFA francs) each year in bribes, or more than 20 percent of the average person's annual income; the average annual income per person was approximately $800 (440,000 CFA francs).

According to Transparency International's 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index, corruption among the country's public officials was perceived by both resident and nonresident experts to be "rampant," which was the most severe assessment designation used by Transparency International.

Unlike in the previous year, international activists did not criticize the government's lack of transparency in managing revenues from an international oil pipeline.

During the year the government also took some steps to fight corruption. For example, on January 25, the government officially launched the activities of the National Agency for the Investigation of Financial Crimes (ANIF). Part of its mission is to fight money laundering, corruption-related enrichment, and the embezzlement of public funds.

On February 3, ANIF conducted a working session with the managers of the financial institutions to train them on effectively participating in the fight against corruption.

On March 11, the president signed a decree repealing the order that created the National Corruption Observatory and a decree creating the National Anticorruption Commission, which replaced the observatory. The commission is under the president's authority. Its leading mission was to monitor and evaluate the effective implementation of the government's anticorruption plan. It also gathered, centralized, and analyzed allegations and information regarding corrupt practices. Findings of the investigations conducted by the commission could lead to disciplinary or legal proceedings.

During the year the government sanctioned approximately 45 government employees and senior officials on corruption and embezzlement charges. Sanctions ra